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“EVERYBODY IS MAKING LOVE/OR ELSE EXPECTING
RAIN”: CONSIDERING THE SEXUAL AUTONOMY
RIGHTS OF PERSONS INSTITUTIONALIZED BECAUSE
OF MENTAL DISABILITY IN FORENSIC HOSPITALS
AND IN ASIA
Michael L. Perlin*
Abstract: One of the most controversial policy questions in all of institutional mental
disability law is the extent to which patients in psychiatric hospitals have a right to voluntary
sexual interaction. The resolution of this matter involves difficult and sensitive questions of
law, social policy, clinical judgment, politics, religion, and family structures. As difficult as
these questions are in cases involving civil hospitals, the difficulties are exacerbated when
the topic is the application of the right in forensic hospitals. Such facilities typically house
individuals involved in the criminal-justice system: who may be incompetent to stand trial;
who have been found incompetent to stand trial; who have been found not guilty by reason of
insanity; or in some cases, who have been convicted of crimes. The legal statuses of these
populations raise public concerns such as the extent to which they are entitled to exercise
civil rights while institutionalized, and the potential additional danger that might be
associated with the granting of sexual freedom to these populations.
Additional difficulties are presented when we consider the application of this right in
both civil and forensic hospitals in Asia, where the notion of “patients’ rights” regrettably
lags far behind the construction of such rights in Western nations. How different would my
conclusions be if I were looking at these issues from an international perspective? And what
impact, if any, would the new United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (U.N. Convention) have on my answer?
It is impossible to meaningfully come to grips with the multiple issues presented in this
Article without also dealing with the social attitude of sanism, an irrational prejudice of the
same quality and character of other irrational prejudices that cause (and are reflected in)
prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnic bigotry. Sanism infects
both our jurisprudence and our lawyering practices; it is largely invisible and largely socially
acceptable, based predominantly upon stereotype, myth, superstition, and
deindividualization. It is sustained and perpetuated by our use of alleged “ordinary common
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sense” and heuristic reasoning in an unconscious response to events both in everyday life and
in the legal process.
This Article will (1) discuss the state of the law that applies to sexual autonomy in
psychiatric institutions, (2) review the social policy issues as they relate to (a) forensic
patients and (b) Asia, (3) explain the pernicious impact of sanism, and (4) seek to offer some
tentative solutions to the underlying dilemmas.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past fifteen years, I have frequently spoken about issues
related to psychiatric patient sexuality. I have grown accustomed to the
“There he goes again!” eye-rolling I get from colleagues when I tell
them that I write and think about the issues related to institutionalized
patients having sex. When I first worked on this topic, I led with this
observation in the introduction to my oral presentation,1 and I assure
you, nothing much has changed since then. But I have gotten older and
wiser (well, older) so my response is much cooler than it used to be.2
But back then—and until very recently—I focused solely on what
would probably be seen as the most benign population to consider: civil
patients in psychiatric hospitals. How would people react if this inquiry
were “jumpshifted” into a discourse about other populations? Back then,
I also focused solely on the domestic aspects of this question. How
different would my conclusions be if I were looking at these issues from
an international perspective? Finally, what impact, if any, would the new
1. See Michael L. Perlin, “Limited in Sex, They Dare”: Attitudes Toward Issues of Patient
Sexuality, 26 AM. J. FOR. PSYCH. 25, 34 (2005) [hereinafter Perlin, Limited] (quoting Michael L.
Perlin, “You Have Discussed Lepers and Crooks”: Sanism in Clinical Teaching, 9 CLINICAL L.
REV. 683, 714 (2003) [hereinafter Perlin, Lepers]).
2. For one pointed exchange, see Perlin, Limited, supra note 1, at 38–39:
I spoke about this topic at a major New York hospital, and thought it worthy to note that, at the
time, only two law professors showed any interest in this topic: myself and Professor Susan
Stefan . . . . An audience member jumped up, and said, “No, Professor. What’s much more
interesting is why you and Professor Stefan are so obsessed with this topic.” (I responded to
him by reaching my hand into my jacket pocket, pulling out an envelope, and saying, “Here’s
my honorarium. Would you like to do a session now?” When I got home and told the story to
my wife [a psychotherapist], she said, “No, what you should have said is, ‘Actually, doctor, the
more interesting question is why you are so obsessed with what you perceive as my
obsession.’” She has always thought better on her feet than I do . . . ).
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United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities3
(U.N. Convention) have on my answer?
To begin with, sexual behavior is inextricably intertwined with
“custom, tradition, and taboo.”4 A consultant to Disabled Women’s
Health Policy and Programs has written that “disabled people are sexual
minority members, due to . . . the presence of the threat in our nurture
and nature.”5 A recent experience reflects these attitudes. Last summer, I
attended the International Academy of Law and Mental Health Congress
in Padua, Italy. At that conference, a colleague (and former student of
mine), New York Law School Adjunct Professor Heather Ellis Cucolo,
gave a fascinating, thoughtful, and balanced talk, Right to Sex in the
Treatment and Civil Commitment of Sexual Violent Predators, as part of
a panel called Disability Rights and the Law.6 The reactions were
astounding. One of her co-panelists sat, rocked back and forth, becoming
redder and redder in the face until I feared she was headed for aneurism
territory. The man next to me in the audience began to draw concentric
circles on a yellow pad, making the circles smaller and smaller, writing
harder and harder until the nib of his pencil broke (I will omit any
Freudian interpretation . . . ). One woman walked out in what I would
call in “high dudgeon.” On the other hand, some of us in the audience
were transfixed, delighted that Professor Cucolo had tackled this most
taboo of taboos.
Baseball fans know the meaning of the phrase “swinging a weighted
bat.” When a player awaits his turn to bat, he often swings a weighted
bat; that is, a bat injected with a metallic substance to make it much
heavier than the regulation bat. The actual bat he swings in the game
then gives the illusion of being much lighter than it is. To some extent,
Professor Cucolo’s talk was the “weighted bat” for me. If you keep her
talk in mind, the topics I address in this Article—the sexual autonomy of

3. G.A. Res. A/61/106, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/106 (Dec. 13, 2006).
4. Tomris Türmen, Reproductive Rights: How to Move Forward?, 4 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 31, 32
(2000).
5. Barbara Waxman Fiduccia, Current Issues in Sexuality and the Disability Movement, 18
SEXUALITY & DISABILITY 167, 169 (2000) (emphasis added). See Michael L. Perlin, On “Sanism,”
46 SMU L. REV. 373, 389 (1992) (“From the beginning of recorded history, mental illness has been
inextricably linked to sin, evil, God’s punishment, crime, and demons.”) [hereinafter Perlin, On
Sanism].
6. See FINAL PROGRAM, XXXTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS ON LAW AND MENTAL HEALTH
(June 25, 2007), at 28, available at http://www.ialmh.org/Padua2007/Final_Program.doc,
permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev481n6.pdf.
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forensic patients7 and the sexual autonomy of patients in Asia8—should
not seem quite so beyond the pale.
Of course, that might just be silly on my part. For if the sexuality of a
civil patient population in the United States is still “a public policy
question as controversial as they get,”9 how then do we begin to
approach the questions of whether forensic patients or patients in Asian
nations have these rights? Additionally, if we begin to slide into the
morass of “cultural relativism” in discussing whether there is, or should
be, a uniquely Asian perspective,10 the entire enterprise becomes even
more challenging. But that is no reason to skirt the issue.
The resolution of these matters involves difficult and sensitive
questions of law, social policy, clinical judgment, politics, religion, and
family structures. Again, as difficult as these questions are in cases
involving civil hospitals, the difficulties are exacerbated when
discussing the application of these rights in forensic hospitals. Such
facilities typically house individuals involved in the criminal-justice
system: people who may be incompetent to stand trial; who have been
found to be incompetent to stand trial; who have been found not guilty
by reason of insanity; or in some cases, who have been convicted of
crimes.11 The statuses of the populations in question raise public
concerns about the extent to which they are entitled to exercise civil
rights while institutionalized,12 and the potential additional danger that
might be associated with granting them sexual freedom.13 As I have
already noted, the problems that we face in grappling with this issue in
the West are further heightened in the context of Asian culture.
7. A population that has always been afforded less autonomy and fewer liberty rights than the
universe of civil patients.
8. Asia is the only region of the world where there is no regional human-rights court or
commission in operation, and a region in which issues of sexual autonomy have often been off the
table as a matter of political and social discourse.
9. Michael L. Perlin, Hospitalized Patients and the Right to Sexual Interaction: Beyond the Last
Frontier?, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 517, 520 (1994) (quoting Rob Karwath, Mental
Center Sex Rule Studied, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 9, 1989, at 1).
10. See infra Part II.B.
11. See generally Michael L. Perlin, “For the Misdemeanor Outlaw”: The Impact of the ADA on
the Institutionalization of Criminal Defendants with Mental Disabilities, 52 ALA. L. REV. 193
(2000). On the procedural-due-process rights of convicted persons in forensic facilities, see, for
example, Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
12. See generally 2 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL,
§§ 3C-1 to 9.2a, at 386–493 (2d ed. 1999) (discussing, inter alia, procedural and substantive rights
of persons in forensic facilities).
13. See id. §§ 3C-5 to 5.2, at 416–21.

485

PERLIN _FN CORRECTED_122008.DOC

Washington Law Review

1/16/2009 2:46 PM

Vol. 83:481, 2008

It is impossible to meaningfully come to grips with the multiple issues
that I am raising here without also coming to grips with the social
attitude of sanism. Sanism is an irrational prejudice of the same quality
and character as other irrational prejudices that cause (and are reflected
in) prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnic
bigotry.14 It infects both our jurisprudence and our lawyering practices,
is largely invisible and largely socially acceptable, and is based
predominantly
upon
stereotype,
myth,
superstition,
and
deindividualization. It is sustained and perpetuated by our use of alleged
“ordinary common sense” and heuristic reasoning in an unconscious
response to events both in everyday life and in the legal process.15 Only
if we contextualize our attitudes toward patient sexuality within the
fabric of our sanist society can we begin to come to grips with the
problem at hand.16
In this Article, I will (1) discuss the state of the law that applies to
sexual autonomy in psychiatric institutions; (2) review the social policy
issues as they relate to (a) forensic patients, and (b) patients in Asia; (3)
explain the pernicious impact of sanism; and (4) offer some tentative
solutions to the underlying dilemmas. The issues before us are ones that
we have been, as a society, all too willing to ignore; however, changes in
social attitudes and changes in the law (as reflected in the U.N.
Convention) require us to turn our attention—seriously—to this matter.
The title for this Article comes from Bob Dylan’s towering
masterpiece, Desolation Row.17 The song has been characterized by
critics as an “image of the world . . . far removed from marches toward
social progress,”18 and as an example of “unjust condemnation of the
sensitive, isolated individual striving for transcendence by a society out
of touch with reality or moral truth that forces conformity to its own
arbitrary and absurd rules based on the selfish desires and fantasies of

14. See generally Perlin, On Sanism, supra note 5.
15. See MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL (2000);
Michael L. Perlin, “Half-Wracked Prejudice Leaped Forth”: Sanism, Pretextuality, and Why and
How Mental Disability Law Developed as It Did, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 3 (1999).
16. See infra Part III.
17. BobDylan.com, Desolation Row, http://bobdylan.com/moderntimes/songs/desolation.html
(last visited Oct. 26, 2008), permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/
83washlrev481n17.pdf.
18. ROBERT SHELTON, NO DIRECTION HOME: THE LIFE AND MUSIC OF BOB DYLAN 283 (Beech
Tree Books 1997).
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those in possession of power . . . .”19 Perhaps, as Adam Lively has
described it, the song is “a repository for all the world’s accumulated
hopes, fears, nightmares, and other dreams . . . . the ultimate testingground of human experience.”20
Desolation Row is a “deliberate cultural jumble”21 built on “general
deviance.”22 So too has mental disability law become a jumbled law
seeking to remediate “general deviance” in a way that is similarly “far
removed from marches toward social progress.” Dylan’s lyric
“Everybody is making love/Or else expecting rain” serves as a perfect
metaphor for the topic that I am discussing here.23
I.

THE STATE OF THE LAW

Remarkably (or perhaps not so remarkably), there is virtually no law
on the books that deals with this precise topic. Some American
jurisdictions have enacted “patients’ bills of rights” providing a broad
array of civil rights and liberties for persons institutionalized in
psychiatric hospitals.24 Most of these laws flow from the historic and
monumental decision Wyatt v. Stickney.25 Wyatt found a broad-based
right to treatment for institutionalized mental patients.26 Despite this
19. Anonymous, Desolation Row, http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Forum/2667/desolati.html
(last
visited
Oct.
26,
2008),
permanent
copy
available
at
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev481n19.pdf.
20. Adam Lively, Adolescence Now, in THE DYLAN COMPANION: A COLLECTION OF ESSENTIAL
WRITING ABOUT BOB DYLAN 198, 208 (Elizabeth Thomson & David Gutman eds. 1990).
21. Frank Kermode & Stephen Spender, The Metaphor at the End of the Funnel, in THE DYLAN
COMPANION, supra note 20, at 155, 158.
22. Id. at 159.
23. A full-scale analysis of Dylan’s metaphors is beyond the scope of this Article. My sense—
honed by having listened to this song hundreds and hundreds of times, and having seen Dylan
perform it on at least a dozen occasions—is that the alternative “or else expecting rain” suggests the
barrenness of a world without sex and love, but always within a context of political change and
revolution. On the other hand, at least one author has argued that at the heart of Desolation Row is
an exploration of “the erotic relationship [that] must be governed by a keeping of promises.” Adam
Gearey, Outlaw Blues: Law in the Songs of Bob Dylan, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 1401, 1406–07
(1999). I disagree with Gearey, and believe that Desolation Row is, at heart, a profoundly political
song.
24. See 2 PERLIN, supra note 12, §§ 3A-14 to 3A-14.5a, at 125–48 (discussing state-level
patients’ bills of rights).
25. 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff’d sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th
Cir. 1974); see generally 2 PERLIN, supra note 12, §§ 3A–3.1 to 3A–3.2d, at 24–57.
26. Wyatt, 344 F. Supp. at 381. I discuss this aspect of Wyatt in Perlin, supra note 9, at 529, and
in Michael L. Perlin, “Make Promises by the Hour”: Sex, Drugs, the ADA, and Psychiatric
Hospitalization, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 947, 965–66 (1997) [hereinafter Perlin, Promises]. See
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ruling, only a few jurisdictions follow the lead of Wyatt and mandate a
limited right to sexual interaction,27 and in at least one of these laws,
there are limitations for forensic patients.28 Of the important post-Wyatt
cases, forensic patients were part of the plaintiff class only in the Ohio
case of Davis v. Watkins.29 Much of the case law ignores forensic
patients entirely. The leading U.S. case, Foy v. Greenblott,30 deals with a
civil patient in a locked ward.31
All of this leads, logically, to the next question: since we are, by all
accounts, a fairly litigious group of people, why has this area—one that
deals with the most personal of rights32—not been the subject of greater
generally Michael L. Perlin et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil Rights of
Institutionalized Mentally Disabled Persons: Hopeless Oxymoron or Path to Redemption?, 1
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 80, 82 (1995) (“[P]atients’ bills of rights in almost all states have
established baseline civil rights governing the substantive and procedural limitations on the
involuntary civil commitment process, the right to treatment, and the right to refuse treatment.”)
(footnotes omitted).
27. See, e.g., MONT. CODE. ANN. § 53-21-142(10) (2005) (“Patients have the right to be provided,
with adequate supervision, suitable opportunities for interaction with members of the opposite sex
except to the extent that a professional person in charge of the patient’s treatment plan writes an
order stating that such interaction is inappropriate to the treatment regimen.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
30:4-24.2(e)(10) (West 1975) (“[Patients have the right] [t]o suitable opportunities for interaction
with members of the opposite sex, with adequate supervision.”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
5122.29(I) (West 2000) (guaranteeing a patient’s “right to social interaction with members of either
sex, subject to adequate supervision, unless such social interaction is specifically withheld under a
patient’s written treatment plan for clear treatment reasons”).
28. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.01(C)(1) & (2). Typically, forensic patients are afforded
fewer civil rights than are civil patients, and they are housed in facilities that provide less personal
autonomy. See also Michael L. Perlin, International Human Rights Law and Comparative Mental
Disability Law: The Universal Factors, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 333, 354–55 (2007).
Virtually all studies and reports referred to in this article have focused on the status (and plight)
of civil patients: those whose commitments to the mental health system were not occasioned by
arrest or other involvement in the criminal court process. Depressingly, persons in the forensic
system generally receive—if this even seems possible—less humane services than do civil
patients.
See id. at 354 (footnote omitted).
29. 384 F. Supp. 1196, 1201–02 (N.D. Ohio 1974). Davis, like most of Wyatt’s early progeny,
was brought in the early 1970s, at a time when the idea that patients at psychiatric hospitals had a
broad array of civil rights was an entirely new (and controversial) development. See, e.g., 2 PERLIN,
supra note 12, § 3A–3.1, at 24–32. At this time, the expansion of any of these rights to individuals
in forensic facilities was simply not “on the table” in most jurisdictions, the Davis litigation being a
rare exception. See id. § 3A–3.3, at 57–59.
30. 190 Cal. Rptr. 84, 87 (Ct. App. 1983).
31. I discuss the significance of Foy in Perlin, supra note 9, at 532–33, in Perlin, Promises, supra
note 26, at 967, and in 2 PERLIN, supra note 12, § 3C-5.1, at 416–21.
32. This is especially ironic in that we acknowledge the significance of sexual autonomy in
related areas of law, but we ignore it here. See Perlin, supra note 9, at 531 (“The law acknowledges
that sexual desire is a sufficiently important personal trait so that its diminution must be weighed
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scrutiny, in court decrees, or even in substantial scholarly writings?33
Although there has been attention paid to this issue in nursing and
psychiatric literature,34 there has been virtually no carryover to the
question of the legal implications of our policies, or the lack of such
policies.35
An examination of key documents in international human-rights law,
on the other hand, provides us with some tantalizing possibilities.
Consider variously: (1) the “right to freedom of association with others”
from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;36 (2) the
express application of these rights to persons with mental disabilities in
the Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and for
the Improvement of Mental Health Care;37 and (3) language in the new
into the formulation of a medication refusal policy. Yet the law simultaneously denies the power
and importance of sexual desire with respect to hospital ward life.”).
33. The only modern law review article on the global issue of mental patient sexuality published
in the United States, other than those that I have written, is Winiviere Sy, The Right of
Institutionalized Disabled Patients to Engage in Consensual Sexual Activity, 23 WHITTIER L. REV.
541 (2001). For a transnational perspective, see Hella von Unger, The Meaning and Management of
Women’s Sexuality in Psychiatric vs. Community-Psychiatric Settings in Berlin, Germany (June 26,
2007) (unpublished paper). Dr. Unger’s paper was presented at the Thirtieth International Congress
on Law and Mental Health, in Padua, Italy. See supra note 6.
34. See, e.g., May Dobal & Diana Torkelson, Sexual Rights of Persons with Serious and
Persistent Mental Illness: Gathering Evidence for Decision Making, 5 J. AM. PSYCHIATRIC NURSES
ASS’N 150 (1999); May Dobal & Diana Torkelson, Making Decisions About Sexual Rights in
Psychiatric Facilities, 18 ARCHIVES PSYCHIATRIC NURSING 68 (2004) [hereinafter Dobal &
Torkelson, Decisions]; Eddie McCann, Exploring Sexual and Relationship Possibilities for People
with Psychosis: A Review of the Literature, 10 J. PSYCHIATRIC & MENTAL HEALTH NURSING 640
(2003); Ronald Stevenson, Sexual Medicine: Why Psychiatrists Must Talk to Their Patients About
Sex, 49 CAN. J. PSYCH. 673 (2004). For an earlier sociological inquiry into the relationship between
social attractiveness and staff attitudes toward patients, see Edmund G. Doherty, Social
Attractiveness and Choice Among Psychiatric Patients and Staff: A Review, 12 J. HEALTH & SOC.
BEHAV. 279 (1971).
35. See Perlin, Last Frontier, supra note 9, at 532 (“[M]any hospitals remain reluctant to
promulgate such policies . . . .”). But see Dobal & Torkelson, Decisions, supra note 34, at 72
(explaining that fifty-six percent of hospitals polled reported having such policies).
36. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 22, Mar. 23, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm, permanent copy available at
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev481n36.pdf.
37. See G.A. Res. 46/119, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/119 (Dec. 17, 1991). Although these Principles
are now superseded by the U.N. Convention, they retain both historical and symbolic significance.
Also, they have been cited as persuasive authority in leading cases on institutional rights and mental
disability law. See, e.g., Victor Rosario Congo v. Ecuador, Case 11.427, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report
No. 63/99, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.102, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 54 n.8 (1999):
The UN Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness are regarded as the most
complete standards for protection of the rights of persons with mental disability at the
international level. These Principles serve as a guide to States in the design and/or reform of
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U.N. Convention that mandates nations to “[p]rovide persons with
disabilities with the same range, quality and standard of free or
affordable health care and programmes as provided to other persons,
including in the area of sexual and reproductive health and populationbased public health programmes.”38 All of these documents provide
potential ammunition for those seeking to secure rights for this class of
individuals.
But it is all, as should be clear, vividly speculative, since to the best of
my knowledge, these issues have never been raised in litigation.39 My
research also fails to reveal any cases on point in any Asian nation, a
topic to which I will return later. The answer to why there has been so
little consideration of these issues lies in a consideration of the
underlying social policy issues.
II.

SOCIAL POLICY ISSUES

There are multiple issues of social policy embedded in this discussion
that contribute to the paucity of attention paid to these issues. First, I will
discuss the issues that relate more specifically to forensic patients.
Second, I will discuss those that may have the greatest relevance to a
consideration of these issues in an Asian context.
A.

Issues Endemic to Forensic Patients

There are clusters of issues that are particularly pertinent in the cases
of forensic patients: (1) those that flow from societal fears of persons
whose connection to the mental health system originates from
involvement in the criminal-justice system; (2) the ways in which those
fears have led to societal short-sightedness in our approach to these
problems; and (3) the rights that such patients have, in spite of these
social attitudes.
mental health systems and are of utmost utility in evaluating the practices of existing systems.
Mental Health Principle 23 establishes that each State must adopt the legislative, judicial,
administrative, educational, and other measures that may be necessary to implement them.
(English translation available in MICHAEL L. PERLIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND
COMPARATIVE MENTAL DISABILITY LAW 809–22 (2006) [hereinafter PERLIN, HUMAN RIGHTS]). I
discuss the significance of the Congo case in, inter alia, Michael L. Perlin, An Internet-Based
Mental Disability Law Program: Implications for Social Change in Nations with Developing
Economies, 40 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 435, 448 (2007).
38. G.A. Res. A/61/106, supra note 3, art. 25.
39. On the relationship between international law and the rights of persons with mental
disabilities, see generally PERLIN, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 37.
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1.

Fears

Fears about patient sexuality emanate from stereotype-driven
misperceptions about patients’ dangerousness, from worries about a
public backlash, and from long-documented overreactions on the part of
hospital administrative staff to the specter of litigation.
a.

A Heightened Fear of Increased Danger Because of the Fact That
the Patients Are Forensic Patients40

The assumption, of course, is that patients in forensic hospitals are
more dangerous than those in civil hospitals and, perhaps directly as a
result of this assumption, are less “worthy” of having “privileges,”41
and/or require greater social control. But this attitude—which appears to
be nearly universal—is based on an assumption that such patients are
more dangerous than the norm. In many jurisdictions, if a patient is
involved in any way with the criminal-justice system, he or she is
automatically housed in the most secure forensic facility no matter the
underlying charge or his individual risk assessment.42 This
administrative decision—one that is rarely noted and even more rarely
challenged43—creates a systemic bias as to all forensic patients,
improperly eliminating the need for individualized risk assessments.44

40. I consider the implications of this false assumption in the context of the non-discrimination
principles of the Americans with Disabilities Act in Perlin, supra note 11.
41. See Rex D. Glensy, Quasi-Global Social Norms, 38 CONN. L. REV. 79, 118 (2005) (“Perhaps
because of its empowering nature, throughout the centuries, individuals and governments have
persistently tried to deny liberty to others, either indiscriminately or by picking and choosing
categories of people whom are deemed worthy or unworthy of enjoying its privileges.”).
42. See Perlin, supra note 11, at 201–02.
43. See, e.g., Hubbard v. State, 812 S.W.2d 107, 110–11 (Ark. 1991); Moten v. Commonwealth,
374 S.E.2d 704, 705 (Va. Ct. App. 1988); State v. LeFlore, 537 N.W.2d 148, No. 94-1825-CR, 1995
WL 366220, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. May 9, 1995) (unpublished table opinion); State v. Phillips, 458
N.W.2d 388, No. 89-1010, 1990 WL 95989, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 1990) (unpublished table
opinion).
44. Cf. Clare Dwyer, Risk, Politics and the “Scientification” of Political Judgement, 47 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 779, 783 (2007) (“As a result of the changing population within the prisons, policy
and risk assessment became concerned with political as opposed to individual risk factors.”).
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A Heightened Fear of Adverse Publicity on the Part of Institutional
Administrators if They Were to Countenance Such Behavior45

I tell my Mental Disability Law students that the most important
mental health policymaker in New York City is the front-page-headline
writer for the New York Post, our most garish and outrageous tabloid (I
am confident readers can fill in the appropriate parallel from their home
towns). All of mental disability law is influenced by the pernicious
power of the vividness heuristic: a cognitive simplifying device that
teaches us that “when decisionmakers are in the thrall of a highly salient
event, that event will so dominate their thinking that they will make
aggregate decisions that are overdependent on the particular event and
that overestimate the representativeness of that event within some larger
array of events.”46 Writing about the high-publicity infanticide cases of
Andrea Yates and Susan Smith, I said this about the power of the
vividness effect: “[T]o the best of my knowledge, little has been written
about the ways that the publicity given to one case involving a specific
mental condition has led to a significant sea change in the ways that
subsequent jurors decide cases involving defendants with a similar
mental condition.”47 It should be no surprise that this has a particularly
onerous impact on this area of law and policy.
c.

The Fear of Tort Litigation That Concomitantly Ignores Potential
Tort Exposure for Maintaining the Status Quo Ante
Fear of tort-based litigation has led to over-confinement48 and overuse

45. For a discussion of this in the contexts of sexually-violent-predator laws, see Michael L.
Perlin, “There’s No Success like Failure/and Failure’s No Success at All”: Exposing the
Pretextuality of Kansas v. Hendricks, 92 NW. U.L. REV. 1247, 1258 n.62 (1998) [hereinafter Perlin,
No Success], and of competency-to-stand-trial cases, see Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental
Disability Law: The Case of Competency, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 625, 638 n.56 (1993) [hereinafter
Perlin, Pretexts].
46. Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 895 (2006). I discuss
the vividness heuristic in the context of mental disability law in, inter alia, Michael L. Perlin, “She
Breaks Just Like a Little Girl”: Neonaticide, the Insanity Defense, and the Irrelevance of “Ordinary
Common Sense,” 10 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 4 (2003) [hereinafter Perlin, She Breaks];
Michael L. Perlin, “The Executioner’s Face Is Always Well-Hidden”: The Role of Counsel and the
Courts in Determining Who Dies, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 201, 231 (1996); Michael L. Perlin, The
Sanist Lives of Jurors in Death Penalty Cases: The Puzzling Role of “Mitigating” Mental Disability
Evidence, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y. 239, 271 (1994). I discuss it specifically in
the context of sexual autonomy in Perlin, supra note 9, at 536 n.118.
47. Perlin, She Breaks, supra note 46, at 2.
48. See Perlin, supra note 11, at 231.
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of restraints,49 notwithstanding a robust collection of cases that have
found liability in cases involving improper commitment50 or improper
use of restraints.51 Many times when I have talked about this general
topic, audience members have expressed a fear of litigation. I posed the
question this way in an earlier article:
[H]ow will the well-documented fear of many mental health
professionals of being sued—what some commentators term
“litigaphobia”52—affect the adoption of, or compliance with,
any policy that appears to increase the potential for patients’
sexual activity (for fear that litigation might quickly follow
unwanted births or the spread of sexually transmitted
diseases)?53
This fear ignores the possibility that patients might sue for violations
of their state statutory rights, federal Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) rights, or international human rights, triggered by a deprivation
of sexual autonomy.54 This is a possibility never discussed in this policy
debate.55

49. See Michael L. Perlin, The Regulation of the Use of Seclusion and Restraints in Mental
Disability Law, http://www.narpa.org/regulation.of.seclusion.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2008),
permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev481n49.pdf. See
generally 2 PERLIN, supra note 12, § 3B-10.6 for a summary of cases dealing with restraint and
seclusion issues.
50. See, e.g., 3 PERLIN, supra note 12, § 7A-6.3, at 345–50 (citing and discussing cases).
51. See id., § 7A-6.4f, at 363–64 (citing and discussing cases).
52. To my knowledge, the term “litigaphobia” was coined by Stanley Brodsky. See Stanley L.
Brodsky, Fear of Litigation in Mental Health Professionals, 15 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 492, 497
(1988) (discussing the overreaction of mental health professionals to the risk of malpractice
litigation). I discuss litigaphobia in a tort-law “duty to protect” context in Michael L. Perlin,
Tarasoff and the Dilemma of the Dangerous Patient: New Directions for the 1990’s, 16 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REV. 29, 61–62 (1992).
53. Perlin, supra note 9, at 525–26 (footnotes omitted).
54. Compare, for example, Foy v. Greenblott, 190 Cal. Rptr. 84 (Ct. App. 1983), where an
institutionalized patient and her infant child sued the mother’s treating doctor for failure to maintain
proper supervision to either prohibit her from having sex or to provide her with contraceptive
devices. On how this phenomenon dominates policy in the area of seclusion-and-restraint law, see
Perlin, supra note 49.
55. If the U.N. Convention—rich with positive social rights—is eventually ratified by Congress
and signed by the President, the resolution of this policy dilemma may eventually be altered, and the
enhancement of individual rights and autonomy might eventually come to be seen as the preferred
approach.
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Short-Sightedness

Failure to take seriously issues of patient sexual autonomy is selfdefeating. It ignores the reality that most patients will be reintegrated
into a community in which sexuality is an important component, and it
stems from our discomfort with even defining “sex.”
a.

A Failure to Consider That the Opportunity to Engage in an
Intimate Relationship May Be Critical to a Patient’s Adjustment to
the Outside World Once Released56

When I first wrote about patient sexuality, I noted a significant issue:
the opportunity to take part in intimate relationships may be critical to a
patient’s successful reintegration into the outside world.57 Professor
Cucolo has focused on this in her recent work on sex offenders. She asks
why we fail to acknowledge that the concept of intimacy is “the key to
preventing and minimizing re-offense.”58 This is a reality that must be
considered as we further explore this issue.59
The literature is clear: we impose significant barriers that prevent
institutionalized persons with mental disabilities from establishing
intimacy.60 Yet, one study showed that most patients in high-security
hospitals “valu[ed] being in a caring relationship [while] in the hospital,”
and that there was likely “an ongoing desire for intimacy regardless of
gender, diagnosis or offense group.”61
56. See, e.g., W.L. Marshall et al., The Enhancement of Intimacy and the Reduction of Loneliness
Among Child Molesters, 11 J. FAMILY VIOLENCE 219, 220 (1996) (“[I]ntimacy deficits and
loneliness are linked to actual offending . . . .”).
57. See Perlin, supra note 9, at 524 (“Is it clinically beneficial or antitherapeutic to allow
institutionalized patients autonomy in sexual decision making? In answering this question, to what
extent ought we consider research on the therapeutic value of touching and physical intimacy?”)
(citing, inter alia, ASHLEY MONTAGU, TOUCHING: THE HUMAN SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SKIN (1971);
H.F. Harlow et al., From Thought to Therapy: Lessons from a Primate Laboratory, 59 AM.
SCIENTIST 538 (1971)).
58. Heather Ellis Cucolo, Right to Sex in the Treatment and Civil Commitment of Sexual Violent
Predators, (June 26, 2007) (unpublished paper), available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/
notes/83washlrev481n58.pdf. Professor Cucolo’s findings were presented at the Thirtieth
International Congress on Law and Mental Health in Padua, Italy. See supra note 6.
59. See Doherty, supra note 34, at 283, 287 (discussing how interpersonal relationships among
patients can help further treatment goals).
60. See Judith A. Cook, Sexuality and People with Psychiatric Disabilities, 18 SEXUALITY &
DISABILITY 195, 200 (2000).
61. Heidi Hales et al., Sexual Attitudes, Experience and Relationships Amongst Patients in a High
Security Hospital, 16 CRIM. BEHAV. & MENTAL HEALTH 254, 260 (2006).
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b.

A Tension Between an Individual’s Right to Free Expression of
Sexuality, and Concern That a Patient Might Act Coercively
Toward Another Patient, Especially in a Mixed-Sex Ward

This is the knottiest problem of all, and one that needs serious and
sober thought. A forensic hospital, by definition, is a closed ward in
most jurisdictions. Inside such a hospital, it may be more difficult to
avoid contact with someone who is “sexually interested” than it often is
in the “free world.” At least one federal appellate court has ruled that
“there must be a fundamental constitutional right to be free from forced
exposure of one’s person to strangers of the opposite sex when not
reasonably necessary for some legitimate, overriding reason . . . .”62
How may the right of institutionalized patients to be free from unwanted
sexual attention be safeguarded in this context? Policymakers need to
take this problem seriously in crafting any sort of protocol. When they
do so, however, they should consider that the only recent study of
sexuality in a high-security hospital concluded that there was “little
evidence” of patients in that setting being coerced into sexual
relationships.63
It is not enough for hospital administrators to presume coercion, using
that assumption as a basis for denying patients their right to free
expression. They must instead carefully craft policies that protect
individuals from “unwanted sexual attention” while still safeguarding
autonomy. There is no evidence that this is an issue being taken
seriously.64
c.

A Failure to Define What We Actually Mean by “Sex”

Without belaboring the obvious, what are we talking about when we
say “sex”?65 Our failure to define and discuss sex reflects our social
62. Kent v. Johnson, 821 F.2d 1220, 1226 (6th Cir. 1987).
63. Hales et al., supra note 61, at 260.
64. See, e.g., Harlan Spector, Should Psychiatric Hospital Patients Be Permitted to Have Sex?,
THE PLAIN-DEALER, June 25, 2008, available at http://blog.cleveland.com/metro/2008/06/should_
psychiatric_hospital_pa.html, permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/
notes/83washlrev481n64.pdf (quoting a patients’ rights attorney questioning whether “women in
psychiatric hospitals are even capable of consenting to sex”).
65. See Sy, supra note 33, at 546 (discussing policies at Napa State Hospital in California that
proscribe “open mouth kissing, oral stimulation of genitals (including breasts), anal stimulation or
intercourse, sexual intercourse . . . promiscuous behavior . . . prolonged closed mouth kissing,
intimate body to body contact, touching underneath clothing, touching of genitals (including
breasts), exhibition of the body in any manner judged to be provocative and sexually
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discomfort and squeamishness with this entire matter. Interestingly, in
one of the few cases establishing any sort of right to sexual interaction, a
federal court in Ohio held—gratuitously, apparently66—that Lima State
Hospital patients have a right to be “provided counseling or other
treatment for homosexuality.”67 Although this language does not appear
to have been adopted by other courts (and the decision is well over thirty
years old), I would not be so bold to predict that sexual-preference issues
would pass entirely under the social radar if sexual autonomy rights
were to be granted to forensic patients.
3.

Rights

Notwithstanding the fears and examples of short-sightedness
catalogued above, the reality is that institutionalized persons with mental
disabilities—including forensic patients—do have at least some right to
sexual expression and autonomy. By rejecting this legal reality, public
opinion creates a social disconnect and allows for an irrational universe
in which the extent to which a patient’s rights may be vindicated may
well rest on a triviality, such as which institution within the same
geographic region of a state the patient is housed in.68
a.

A Disconnect Between Potential Legal Sources That Might Support
the Right69 and Public Opinion That Utterly Rejects That Position70

It is not difficult for me to predict the level of public outrage if this
idea were to be suggested by a politician. There was a movement to
drum out of office the New York City Chancellor of Education when he
solicitous . . . .” (internal quotation and footnote omitted)); see also Perlin, supra note 9, at 527
(“Does it make a difference if we are discussing monogamous heterosexual sex, polygamous
heterosexual sex, monogamous homosexual sex, polygamous homosexual sex, or bisexual sex?
Does sex mean intercourse? What about oral sex? Anal sex? Masturbation? Voyeurism?
Exhibitionism?”) (footnotes omitted).
66. There is no evidence that this issue was ever raised by either party in court pleadings or oral
arguments.
67. Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196, 1208 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
68. See infra text accompanying notes 72–74.
69. I argue in Perlin, Promises, supra note 26, at 965–70, that this right is protected by the
Americans with Disabilities Act.
70. Compare Perlin, Limited, supra note 1, at 36 (“When I gave this talk at the Florida Institute of
Mental Health (part of the University of South Florida in Tampa), an audience member (from the
general public) leapt to his feet, and denounced me: ‘Professor Perlin, you are an agent of the
devil!’”) with id. at 36–41 (discussing reactions to presentations on this topic in audiences more
receptive than the general public).
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said that condoms should be made available to high-school students.71
The reaction to what I am discussing here would be, I expect, more
intense. But that should not end the discussion. At the least, the idea that
institutionalized psychiatric patients have some sexual autonomy rights
should be tested in a court of law—an arm of government presumably
less susceptible to the vicissitudes of public pressure than administrative
agencies.
b.

The Intra-Jurisdictional Inconsistencies That Often Accompany the
Development of Institutional Sex Policies

In her article about sexual activities in California institutions,
Winiviere Sy points out the significant disparity between the restrictive
policies at Napa State Hospital72 and the less restrictive ones at Sonoma
Developmental Center.73 In at least one New York hospital, there have
been different policies for male and female patients. Male patients
leaving the facility on unsupervised community leave would be given
condoms upon request. Female patients, on the other hand, had to have
their competency (informally) assessed before birth-control pills could
be prescribed.74 This makes no conceptual sense, of course, and is most
likely a reflection of the head-in-the-sand way we approach the
underlying issues.75
B.

Issues Endemic to Asia76

I found it very interesting that, when I told knowledgeable colleagues
that I was writing this Article, they inevitably said, “Good luck with
your research! You won’t find a thing [about this specific sub-topic].”
71. See Perlin, supra note 9, at 526 n.44.
72. See supra note 33.
73. Sy, supra note 33, at 547 (explaining that patients were allowed to engage “in activity
directed to sexual arousal, because the expression of one’s sexuality is the right of every person”)
(internal quotation and footnote omitted).
74. Perlin, supra note 9, at 541.
75. Much of the development of patients’ rights litigation over the past thirty-five years has gone
to ensure that there are “individualized treatment plans” for each institutionalized individual. See
generally 2 PERLIN, supra note 12, § 3A–3.1c. We totally ignore this when it comes to issues of
sexuality.
76. On the question of whether Asians are more likely to be civilly committed than are
Caucasians, see S. Ali et al., Are Asians at Greater Risk of Compulsory Psychiatric Admission than
Caucasians in the Acute General Adult Setting?, 47 MED. SCI. & L. 311 (2007) (discussing how
Asian patients are significantly overrepresented as inpatients in some psychiatric hospitals).
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Perhaps I have just been blessed to have a superb research assistant (it is
always good to be lucky). But the reality is that my colleagues were
wrong, and that there is some literature on this point, albeit to me,
extraordinarily depressing literature.77 Before looking at that literature,
though, I will first address the issue of “cultural relativism.”
1.

Cultural Relativism

Advocates of cultural relativism “claim that rights and rules about
morality . . . are encoded in and thus depend on cultural context.”78 I
believe that cultural relativism is an inappropriate approach to this
question. I unequivocally endorse the arguments of Patrick Hui, writing
about birth-control policies in China in the context of the United
Nation’s Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW):79 “Cultural relativism is not sufficient
justification for the denial of the universal application of human rights
standards.”80 As Arati Rao has stated: “[T]he notion of culture favored
by international actors must be unmasked for what it is: a falsely rigid,
ahistorical, selectively chosen set of self-justificatory texts and practices
whose patent partiality raises the question of exactly whose interests are
being served and who comes out on top.”81 I begin with this position to
77. Most, but not all, of the information available in the English language is from China and
Japan. I am hoping that the publication of this Article will spur interest in this topic in other Asian
nations.
78. Hirad Abtahi, Reflections on the Ambiguous Universality of Human Rights: Cyrus the Great’s
Proclamation as a Challenge to the Athenian Democracy’s Perceived Monopoly on Human Rights,
36 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 55, 56 (2007) (quoting HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 192 (1996)).
79. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res.
34/180, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (Dec. 18, 1979).
80. Patrick T.C. Hui, Birth Control in China: Cultural, Gender, Socio-economic and Legislative
Perspectives in Light of CEDAW Standards, 32 H.K.L.J. 187, 199 (2002); see also Joel Richard
Paul, Cultural Resistance to Global Governance, 22 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 13 n.51 (2000) (citing,
inter alia, Michael C. Davis, Constitutionalism and Political Culture: The Debate over Human
Rights and Asian Values, 11 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 109 (1998) (criticizing cultural relativism as
deterministic and tautological)); Karen Engle, Culture and Human Rights: The Asian Values Debate
in Context, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 291 (2000) (same); Simon S.C. Tay, Human Rights,
Culture, and the Singapore Example, 41 MCGILL L.J. 743 (1996) (examining the problematic
character of the cultural argument in the context of Asian human rights)).
81. Arati Rao, The Politics of Gender and Culture in International Human Rights Discourse, in
WOMEN’S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 167, 174 (Julie
Peters & Andrea Wolper eds., 1995). For an anthropological perspective, see also Ann-Belinda S.
Preis, Human Rights as Cultural Practice: An Anthropological Critique, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 286
(1996) (rejecting cultural relativism). On deploying cross-cultural perspectives in this inquiry, see
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preempt those who would reject the universality of human rights as they
apply to all aspects of mental disability law.82
2.

Rights in China

It is necessary to first look at China’s history of mandatory
sterilization of persons with mental retardation. In the 1980s, laws were
passed in Gansu province: first, forbidding individuals with “hereditary
retardation” from having children,83 then, mandating sterilization for
such individuals.84 Similar laws were enacted in other provinces, and
within a few years, there were parallel laws in five other sectors, some
forbidding marriage, some forbidding childbearing, and some mandating
sterilization.85 These laws, which apply to one-third of China’s
population, flowed in significant part from the predominant Chinese
notion that mental disabilities were “inherited” diseases.86
China’s 1994 Law on Maternal and Infant Health Care requires
Man Yee Karen Lee, Universal Human Dignity: Some Reflections in the Asian Context, 3 ASIAN J.
COMP. L., Issue 1, art. 10, at 1 (2008).
82. Cf. Michael L. Perlin, International Human Rights and Comparative Mental Disability Law:
The Role of Institutional Psychiatry in the Suppression of Political Dissent, 39 ISR. L. REV. 69, 89–
92 (2006) (discussing societal blindness to ongoing violations of the international human-rights law
of persons with mental disabilities); Perlin, supra note 28, at 333 (examining universal factors to
determining international human-rights violations involving persons with mental disabilities);
Michael L. Perlin & Eva Szeli, Mental Health Law and Human Rights: Evolution and
Contemporary Challenges, in MENTAL HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Michael Dudley ed.,
forthcoming 2008) (discussing the history of the intersection—or lack thereof—of debates over
human
rights
and
disability
rights),
available
at
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev481n82.pdf; Michael L. Perlin, “Through the
Wild Cathedral Evening”: Barriers, Attitudes, Participatory Democracy, Professor tenBroek, and
the Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities, 13 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 413 (2008) [hereinafter
Perlin, Wild Cathedral] (discussing literature on persons with mental disabilities and international
human rights).
83. See Linda Johnson, Expanding Eugenics or Improving Health Care in China: Commentary on
the Provisions of the Standing Committee of the Gansu People’s Congress Concerning the
Prohibition of Reproduction by Intellectually Impaired Persons, 24 J.L. & SOC’Y 199, 221–22
(1997) (reprinting Provisions of the Standing Committee of the Gansu People’s Congress
Concerning the Prohibition of Reproduction by Intellectually Impaired Persons, adopted Nov. 23,
1988).
84. Daniel S. Gewirtz, Toward a Quality Population: China’s Eugenic Sterilization of the
Mentally Retarded, 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 139, 149 (1994).
85. See Gewirtz, supra note 84, at 149; Matthew D. Martin III, The Dysfunctional Progeny of
Eugenics: Autonomy Gone AWOL, 15 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 371, 408 (2007).
86. See Gewirtz, supra note 84, at 149 (mental retardation perceived to be inherited); Johnson,
supra note 83, at 226 n.38 (schizophrenia and manic depression presumed to be inheritable
diseases).
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premarital checkups to determine the presence of “relevant mental
diseases,”87 defined as mental diseases that “may have an adverse effect
on marriage and child-bearing.”88 The Chinese Marriage Law forbids
marriage if either individual “is suffering from any disease that is
regarded by medical science as rend[er]ing [sic] a person unfit for
marriage,”89 a category regularly construed to include mental
disabilities.90 Beyond that, the law adds that a marriage is invalid “if any
party has suffered from any disease that is held by medical science as
rend[er]ing [sic] a person unfit for getting married and the disease has
not been cured after marriage.”91
3.

Rights in Japan

Although the state of affairs in Japan is not quite as bleak, an article
considering the role of the disability-rights advocacy movement in that
nation notes that individuals with disabilities “have been taught from an
early age to accept as well as cherish their dependence on the care they
receive from parents and institutions.”92 Scholars have begun to consider
the negative social repercussions of principles of hierarchy and
dependence in Japanese society,93 but they have paid little attention to
the specific intersection between these principles and sexual autonomy.

87. Law of the People’s Republic of China on Maternal and Infant Health Care, art. 8(3),
available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383796.htm, permanent
copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev481n87.pdf.
88. Id. art. 7(3).
89. Marriage Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. 7(b), available at
http://www.lawinfochina.com/law/display.asp?db=1&id=1793&keyword,
permanent
copy
available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev481n89.pdf.
90. See Xiaoqing Feng, A Review of the Development of Marriage Law in the People’s Republic
of China, 79 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 331, 337 (2002).
91. Marriage Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. 10(c), available at
http://www.lawinfochina.com/law/display.asp?db=1&id=1793&keyword,
permanent
copy
available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev481n91.pdf.
92. Katharina Heyer, From Special Needs to Equal Rights: Japanese Disability Law, 1 ASIANPAC. L. & POL’Y J., Issue 1, at 1, 17 (1999).
93. See, e.g., Taimie L.Bryant, For the Sake of the Country, For the Sake of the Family: The
Oppressive Impact of Family Registration on Women and Minorities in Japan, 39 UCLA L. REV.
109, 109 n.2 (1991) (citing, inter alia, TAKEO DOI, THE ANATOMY OF DEPENDENCE (1973)
(discussing the role of presumption on the benevolence of hierarchical superiors in Japanese
personality and society); Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Arthur Rosett, The Implications of Apology: Law
and Culture in Japan and the United States, 20 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 461 (1986) (discussing the
intersection between various psychological features connected to hierarchical social organization
and the legal system)).
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These two portraits—a nation that seeks to suppress all sexuality in
individuals with mental disabilities,94 and a nation that privileges
institutional dependence—do not lead to much optimism as we consider
the matter currently before us. However, I do not want to paint an
entirely pessimistic picture, as there is some recognition of the problem.
In supporting the need for a U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities, delegates to an Asia-Pacific regional conference held
in Bangkok in 2003 declared that “international human rights standards
require that people with disabilities should enjoy the same basic human
rights as all other human beings.”95 Sadly, this statement appears at odds
with prevailing social and cultural norms as well as legislation in much
of this region.96 The delegates noted that such persons are subjected to
“widespread violations of their human rights,” including specifically,
“forced sterilisation.”97
The U.N. Convention and the Bangkok recommendations98 are
encouraging. However, the backdrop of the Chinese and Japanese
experiences remind us that realization of the rights set out in the
Convention will not come easily.99 Advocates and activists in this area
face barriers when seeking to articulate and implement an array of
sexual autonomy rights for persons with mental disabilities. In short, this
is not an easy question.
III. SANISM
Sanism is an irrational prejudice of the same quality and character as
other irrational prejudices that cause and are reflected in prevailing
social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnic bigotry. It
94. Cf. Vanessa Torres Hernandez, Making Good on the Promise of International Law: The
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Inclusive Education in China and India,
17 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 497 (2008) (concluding that China fails to provide universal education
for children with disabilities).
95. Bangkok Recommendations on the Elaboration of a Comprehensive and Integral
International Convention to Promote and Protect the Rights and Dignity of Persons with
Disabilities (2003), available at http://www.worldenable.net/bangkok2003/recommendations.htm,
permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev481n95.pdf
[hereinafter Bangkok Recommendations].
96. Cf. Man-Chung Chiu, Development of an Indigenous Legal Theory of Sexual Justice in Hong
Kong, 37 H.K.L.J. 775 (2007) (discussing the possibility of creating an indigenous legal theory of
sexual justice in Hong Kong).
97. See Bangkok Recommendations, supra note 95.
98. See id.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 83–93.
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permeates all aspects of mental disability law and affects all participants
in the mental disability law system: litigants, fact-finders, counsel, and
expert and lay witnesses.100 Its corrosive effects have warped mental
disability jurisprudence in the law of involuntary civil commitment,
institutional law, tort law, and all aspects of the criminal process
(pretrial, trial, and sentencing).101 It reflects what civil-rights lawyer
Florynce Kennedy has characterized the “pathology of oppression.”102 In
earlier articles, I have explored the relationship between sanism and
sexuality.103 If sanist myths, based on stereotypes, are the result of rigid
categorization
and
overgeneralization,
then
they
function
psychologically to “localize our anxiety, to prove to ourselves that what
we fear does not lie within.”104 We thus have labeled all individuals with
mental illness as being “deviant, morally weak, sexually uncontrollable,
[and] emotionally unstable.”105 And often, we (especially
professionals)106 regard those with mental disabilities as being
fundamentally different from us, lacking human qualities such as the
needs for affection and dignified ways of expressing affection.107
A.

Sanist Myths

Our attitudes toward the sexuality of persons with mental disabilities
reflect this labeling in this way:
Society tends to infantilize the sexual urges, desires, and needs
of the mentally disabled. Alternatively, they are regarded as
possessing an animalistic hypersexuality, which warrants the
imposition of special protections and limitations on their sexual
behavior to stop them from acting on these “primitive” urges.

100. See Perlin, On Sanism, supra note 5, at 398–405.
101. See id. at 400–05.
102. See Morton Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment: Some Comments on Its Development, in
MEDICAL, MORAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE 97, 107 (Frank J. Ayd, Jr. ed., 1974)
(discussing Kennedy’s conception of sanism).
103. See PERLIN, supra note 15; Perlin, Lepers, supra note 1; Perlin, On Sanism, supra note 5.
104. SANDER L. GILMAN, DIFFERENCE AND PATHOLOGY: STEREOTYPES OF SEXUALITY, RACE,
AND MADNESS 240 (1985).
105. Perlin, On Sanism, supra note 5, at 383.
106. Although I refer here primarily to mental health professionals, lawyers often mirror the same
attitudes. See, e.g., Spector, supra note 64 (describing the chief lawyer for the nonprofit Nebraska
Advocacy Services as questioning “whether women in psychiatric hospitals are even capable of
consenting to sex”). On sanist behavior by lawyers, see generally Perlin, Lepers, supra note 1.
107. See generally Perlin, Limited, supra note 1.
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By focusing on alleged “differentness,” we deny their basic
humanity and their shared physical, emotional, and spiritual
needs. By asserting that theirs is a primitive morality, we allow
ourselves to censor their feelings and their actions. By denying
their ability to show love and affection, we justify this disparate
treatment.108
Think about the basic “sanist myths” that I have discussed previously
in the specific context of this Article’s topic:
1. Mentally ill individuals are “different,” and, perhaps, less than
human. They are erratic, deviant, morally weak, sexually
uncontrollable, emotionally unstable, superstitious, lazy,
ignorant and demonstrate a primitive morality. They lack the
capacity to show love or affection. They smell different from
“normal” individuals, and are somehow worth less.
2. Most mentally ill individuals are dangerous and frightening.
They are invariably more dangerous than non-mentally ill
persons, and such dangerousness is easily and accurately
identified by experts. At best, people with mental disabilities are
simple and content, like children. Either parens patriae or police
power supply a rationale for the institutionalization of all such
individuals.
3. Mentally ill individuals are presumptively incompetent to
participate in “normal” activities, to make autonomous decisions
about their lives (especially in areas involving medical care),
and to participate in the political arena.
4. If a person in treatment for mental illness declines to take
prescribed antipsychotic medication, that decision is an excellent
predictor of (1) future dangerousness, and (2) need for
involuntary institutionalization.
5. Mental illness can easily be identified by lay persons and
matches up closely to popular media depictions. It comports
with our common sense notion of crazy behavior.
6. It is, and should be, socially acceptable to use pejorative
labels to describe and single out people who are mentally ill; this
singling out is not problematic in the way that the use of
pejorative labels to describe women, blacks, Jews or gays and
lesbians might be.
7. Mentally ill individuals should be segregated in large, distant
108. Perlin, supra note 9, at 537 (footnotes omitted).
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institutions because their presence threatens the economic and
social stability of residential communities.
8. The mentally disabled person charged with crime is
presumptively the most dangerous potential offender, as well as
the most morally repugnant one. The insanity defense is used
frequently and improperly as a way for such individuals to beat
the rap; insanity tests are so lenient that virtually any mentally ill
offender gets a free ticket through which to evade criminal and
personal responsibility. The insanity defense should be
considered only when the mentally ill person demonstrates
objective evidence of mental illness.
9. Mentally disabled individuals simply don’t try hard enough.
They give in too easily to their basest instincts, and do not
exercise appropriate self restraint.
10. If “do-gooder,” activist attorneys had not meddled in the
lives of people with mental disabilities, such individuals would
be where they belong (in institutions), and all of us would be
better off. In fact, there’s no reason for courts to involve
themselves in all mental disability cases.109
These myths contaminate those social policies that deal with and
control the lives of persons with mental disabilities, especially
institutionalized persons with mental disabilities. And they are most
pernicious when it comes to issues of sexuality.
B.

Sanism in Asia

In China, these biases are more pronounced. A news report
summarized what experts characterize as “the social view that is
currently held by the general public in China”: “[Mentally retarded]
people make no contribution to the society, are invisible shackles to their
parents, cause great misery to themselves, and are a heavy burden to the
country.”110 It is hard to imagine a more sanist sentence.
These attitudes are exaggerated in other Asian cultures as well. A
review of Malaysian law concludes that current Mayalsian mental-health
legislation “reflects the stigmatizing approach toward the persons with
mental illness that prevailed in the 1950s and 1960s,” an approach in

109. Perlin, Lepers, supra note 1, at 724–25 n.220.
110. Hongjun Su & Don C. Van Dyke, Breaking the Silence and Overcoming the Invisibility:
Down Syndrome in China, Part I, 20 INT’L PEDIATRICS 25, 28 (2005) (internal citation omitted).
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which mental illness is viewed as a “purely biological aberration.”111 A
Hong Kong study stressed:
In Chinese societies, there is more severe stigma against
individuals and thus relatives of mental health consumers, as
Chinese culture attaches more importance to the collective
representation of families, and having a mentally ill relative is
considered something one should feel ashamed of, for it can
imply an inferior origin of the family, failure of the parents, or
even sin committed by ancestors.112
The authors of the study concluded that this social stigma “has
tremendous impacts on the recovery of individuals with mental illness in
terms of employment, social resources, and availability of communitybased facilities.”113 The relationship between the legacy of this stigma—
feelings of shame and inferiority—and the repression of the sexuality of
persons with mental disabilities in Asian cultures should be crystal
clear.114
C.

Influence of Sanism on Forensic Patients

If there has ever been a special-interest group with no lobby, support
system, political-action committee, or fan club, it is that of forensic
psychiatric patients. It is a sure bet that at this moment there is no
organized group of advocates whose “action agenda” leads off with,
“Let’s make sure that forensic patients have a right to sex!” My research
turns up nothing—not a single court case, article, or Internet mention—
that addresses this issue.
Some of this state of affairs, this abject lack of interest, results in part
from the policy dilemmas that I discussed earlier.115 However, even
111. A. Rahamuthulla Mubarak, Malaysia’s Social Policies on Mental Health: A Critical Theory,
17 J. HEALTH & SOC. POL’Y 55, 59 (2003). Of course, there are many nations with no mental health
law at all. See Perlin, supra note 28, at 337 (citing to recent report by the World Health
Organization revealing that twenty-five percent of all nations in the world have no such law).
112. Hector W.H. Tsang et al., Stigmatizing Attitudes Towards Individuals with Mental Illness in
Hong Kong: Implications for Their Recovery, 31 J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 383, 385 (2003); see
generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 37 (1994) (“Ever
since Prince Ptah-hotep attempted the first classification of mental illness almost five thousand
years ago, conceptions of such illness have been inextricably linked to the notion of sin . . . .”)
(footnotes omitted).
113. Tsang et al., supra note 112, at 394.
114. On the invisibility of persons with mental disabilities in China, illustrated by the treatment of
those with Down Syndrome, see generally Su & Van Dyke, supra note 110.
115. See supra Part II.A.
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more of it results from the omnipresence of sanism. The peculiar
interplay between sanism and sexuality—an interplay that I have
discussed extensively in the past116—is particularly warped in
considerations of the right of forensic patients to exercise sexual
autonomy while institutionalized.
Because of sanism, we attribute to all forensic patients an immutable
and pernicious level of dangerousness—one that is constant, universal,
and not subject to remediation. Because of sanism, we employ the
vividness heuristic so as to typify all behaviors of all forensic patients,
based on what some patients might do some of the time.117 Because of
sanism, we blind ourselves to violations of constitutional and statutory
rights (domestic and international) for fear of “bad publicity.” A review
of my book, The Hidden Prejudice, made this point better than I could:
It is likely many readers will have trouble staying “on the bus”
with Perlin when they read Chapter Seven in which he argues
for the right of institutionalized persons to have sexual
interaction. Perhaps that proves Perlin’s point, however, about
how extensive, pervasive, and culturally rooted prejudices
against persons with mental illness are, serving “ultimately as a
‘Rorschach test’ for the degree to which we are willing to punish
people via restrictions of the ability to exercise civil rights
because they suffer from mental illness.”118
If we ignore these realities, any attempt to have a constructive
conversation about the issue of sanism will be doomed to fail.
D.

Impact of the U.N. Convention

I indicated earlier that a “cultural relativism defense,” which would
endorse a perpetuation of the status quo, fails.119 This rejection is not
simply premised on personal preference or on philosophical position, but
is also grounded in the law, specifically the new U.N. Convention.120 As
I noted earlier, the U.N. Convention mandates that nations “[p]rovide
persons with disabilities with the same range, quality and standard of

116. See generally Perlin, supra note 9; Perlin, Limited, supra note 1.
117. See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text.
118. Bruce Spector, Disabilities and the Law, 12 BIMONTHLY REV. L. BOOKS, No. 3 (May–June
2001), at 15, 18, available at http://www.nesl.edu/library/bimonthly/brlb123.doc, permanent copy
available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev481n118.pdf.
119. See supra notes 78–82 and accompanying text.
120. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. A/61/106, supra note 3.
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free or affordable health care and programmes as provided to other
persons, including in the area of sexual and reproductive health and
population-based public health programmes.”121 Not insignificantly, the
U.N. Convention also mandates that such individuals “retain their
fertility on an equal basis with others.”122 Professors Michael Stein and
Janet Lord have recently written eloquently about how another Article in
the U.N. Convention—Article 30, which sets out social rights of
participation in cultural life—“serves as a vital channel of engagement
with such society when such participation is embraced by the
community,” and increases “self-reliance and empowerment.”123 Other
commentators have concluded that the U.N. Convention “is regarded as
having finally empowered the ‘world’s largest minority’ to claim their
rights, and to participate in international and national affairs on an equal
basis with others who have achieved specific treaty recognition and
protection.”124 If the U.N. Convention is taken seriously—if it is, in fact,
more than a “paper victor[y]”125—then perhaps it can be used as a
vehicle to uproot that aspect of sanism that continues to deny sexual
rights to institutionalized persons with mental disabilities.126
121. Id. art. 25 (a).
122. Id. art. 23 (1)(c).
123. Michael Ashley Stein & Janet Lord, Jacobus tenBroek, Participatory Justice, and the UN
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 13 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 167, 182 (2008). I
discuss this article extensively in Perlin, Wild Cathedral, supra note 82.
124. Rosemary Kayess & Phillip French, Out of Darkness into Light? Introducing the Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 8 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 4 (2008) (footnotes omitted); see
also id. at 4 n.17 (citing statements made by the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise
Arbour, and the Permanent Representative of New Zealand and Chair of the Ad-Hoc Committee on
a Comprehensive and Integral International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the
Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, Ambassador Don Mackay, at a Special Event on the
Convention on Rights of Persons with Disabilities, convened by the U.N. Human Rights Council,
26 March 2007).
125. Michael L. Perlin, “What’s Good Is Bad, What’s Bad Is Good, You’ll Find out When You
Reach the Top, You’re on the Bottom”: Are the Americans with Disabilities Act (and Olmstead v.
L.C.) Anything More Than “Idiot Wind”?, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 235, 246 (2002) (quoting
Michael Lottman, Paper Victories and Hard Realities, in PAPER VICTORIES AND HARD REALITIES:
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY DISABLED
93 (Valerie J. Bradley & Gary J. Clarke eds., 1976)). In the specific context of United Nations
Conventions, see Sara Dillon, What Human Rights Law Obscures: Global Sex Trafficking and the
Demand for Children, 17 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 121, 154 (2008) (“A specialized human rights
convention does not in itself guarantee substantial change . . . .”).
126. There is some evidence that in other jurisdictions, parallel rights are being taken seriously.
See, e.g., Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended
by Protocol No. 11, Nov. 1, 1998, art. 8(1), available at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/EN/
Treaties/html/005.htm, permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/
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In summary, the climb uphill is steep. Those seeking fundamental and
systemic changes in this area need to confront a powerful array of forces
designed to blunt or subvert change: our tradition of palpable discomfort
when it comes to even thinking about patient sexuality;127 our fears about
expanding autonomy rights for any patients in forensic institutions;128
the tradition in some Asian nations of seeking to suppress all sexual
behavior on the part of persons with mental disabilities;129 and the
omnipresence of sanism130 (abetted by pretextuality,131 the use of
heuristics,132 and the use of false “ordinary common sense”).133 It is my
hope that this Article calls attention to this cluster of issues so as to
begin the remediation process.
IV. SOME TENTATIVE SOLUTIONS
It seems futile to offer “solutions” to a problem that most do not even
realize exists, particularly when most people vehemently reject the
notion that there is any need for remediation. But I will try. Perhaps
these thoughts will be of some interest or help.134 I recognize that—in
and of themselves—my solutions will not eliminate the entire array of
problems discussed in this Article. But I do believe that if they are
83washlrev481n126.pdf, construed in X. v. Iceland, App. No. 6825/74, 5 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec.
& Rep. 86, 87 (1976) (finding that the Article prohibiting public authorities from interfering with a
person’s right to respect for his private and family life, his home, and his correspondence is broad
enough to encompass an entitlement to “establish and to develop relationships with other human
beings, especially in the emotional field for the development and fulfillment of one’s own
personality”). This issue is discussed in Lawrence O. Gostin & Lance Gable, The Human Rights of
Persons with Mental Disabilities: A Global Perspective on the Application of Human Rights
Principles to Mental Health, 63 MD. L. REV. 20, 94 (2004).
127. See generally Perlin, Limited, supra note 1.
128. See generally Perlin, supra note 11 (discussing the overuse of maximum-security facilities
as sites for evaluations of defendants in incompetency and insanity cases).
129. See, e.g., Gewirtz, supra note 84; Johnson, supra note 83.
130. See, e.g., Perlin, On Sanism, supra note 5.
131. See generally Perlin, supra note 15; Perlin, No Success, supra note 45; Perlin, Pretexts,
supra note 45.
132. See, e.g., Perlin, She Breaks, supra note 46.
133. See Perlin, supra note 15, at 14; Michael L. Perlin, Psychodynamics and the Insanity
Defense: “Ordinary Common Sense” and Heuristic Reasoning, 69 NEB. L. REV. 3 (1990).
134. One of these recommendations (the third) applies specifically to forensic issues; another (the
fifth) applies specifically to issues involving Asian nations (though “cultural relativism” issues are
certainly raised in human-rights contexts in other nations as well). The rest apply equally to both, as
well as to the question of patient sexuality in other contexts such as civil hospitals and Western
nations.
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implemented, we will begin to make some modest progress, and we will,
for the first time, treat patients “as human beings.”135
First, we must take our heads out of the sand and confront the fact
that institutionalized psychiatric patients—like the rest of us—think
about sex. (I had originally typed in “all the time,” and then deleted
it . . . maybe . . . ) It is a fatal error to think otherwise. In one of my
earlier articles, I shared this vignette from a visit to a psychiatric hospital
in Uruguay:
[I] was visiting a ward that, we were told, housed “highfunctioning” teenage males. Some, in fact, were not mentally ill
at all, but were individuals with physical disabilities who had
been “dumped” at the institution within a week of being born,
and had been there ever since.
I asked a staff member about patient sexuality, and was told,
“Please! There’s not one of them interested in sex!” We then
walked into the day room, where a music video was on the TV
(a far more R-rated video that one might see on MTV or VH-1),
including a scene of two teenage girls kissing passionately and
deeply. Judging by the expressions on the boys’ faces, their
agitation, and their comments to their ward mates, the staff
member could not have been more wrong.136
Had the staff acknowledged the reality—that the teenage boys had
sexual feelings and were expressing normal sexual urges—then the
institution might have been able to begin to think about structuring
meaningful sexual-autonomy policies that comport with international
human-rights norms and standards.
Second, we must also acknowledge that the great majority of
residents in such facilities will eventually leave and reenter free society.
This should force us to think about how repressive sexual policies (or
non-policies) will affect their behavior in the free world.
Third, we must come to grips with the extent to which our sanist
behavior drives our attitudes in these cases. By treating all patients in
this legal category as if they are likely to be randomly sexually violent—

135. Falter v. Veterans’ Admin., 502 F. Supp. 1178, 1185 (D.N.J. 1980). I discuss the
implications of this opinion for all matters that involve the marginalization of persons with mental
disabilities in Michael L. Perlin & John Douard, “Equality, I Spoke that Word/As if a Wedding
Vow”: Mental Disability Law and How We Treat Marginalized Persons, __ N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. __
(forthcoming 2008), available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev481n135.
pdf.
136. Perlin, Limited, supra note 1, at 37.
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ignoring the fact that many forensic patients are charged with minor
offenses (in some jurisdictions, mere misdemeanors)137—we blind
ourselves to social realities.
Fourth, this discourse must consider the therapeutic jurisprudence
implications of how we treat such patients. I wrote the following fifteen
years ago, and it still applies:
We must also question the therapeutic or antitherapeutic
implications of official hospital policies that control the place,
manner, and frequency with which such individuals can have
sexual interactions. We must consider the implications of these
policies on ward life and their implications for patients’ posthospital lives. These questions are difficult ones, but we must
ask them nonetheless if we wish to formulate a thoughtful,
comprehensive response to the wide range of questions this
subject raises.138
The development of therapeutic jurisprudence as an academic
discipline139 should force us to consider the therapeutic outcomes of
different policies about sexual activity.
Fifth, we must recognize that for these purposes cultural relativism is
a pretextual sham.140 We must be willing to reject it as a barrier to the
ability of persons with mental disabilities to exercise their human and
legal rights.
Finally, changes in the law, such as the passage of the ADA in the
United States and the publication of the U.N. Convention, have the
potential to shift policies governing much of institutional and
community-based mental disability law. For this to happen, lawyers
need to start thinking about the underlying issues. So far, this has not
137. See Perlin, supra note 11.
138. Perlin, supra note 9, at 547.
139. Therapeutic jurisprudence presents a new model by which we can assess the ultimate impact
of case law and legislation on mentally disabled individuals. Therapeutic jurisprudence requires (1)
studying the role of the law as a therapeutic agent; (2) recognizing that substantive rules, legal
procedures, and lawyers’ roles may have either therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences; and
(3) questioning whether such rules, procedures, and roles can or should be reshaped so as to
enhance their therapeutic potential, while not subordinating due-process principles. See Perlin, She
Breaks, supra note 46, at 30–31 n.233. See generally ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
(David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1991); LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds.,
1996); THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE APPLIED: ESSAYS ON MENTAL HEALTH LAW (Bruce J.
Winick ed., 1997); THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT (David B.
Wexler ed., 1990).
140. I discuss pretextuality extensively in PERLIN, supra note 15, and Perlin, supra note 15.
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happened. My recommendation to my fellow members of the bar is to
get at it. I have written extensively about how sanism affects lawyers,141
even lawyers who focus their practices on the representation of
marginalized persons.142 It is essential that this reality be taken seriously
by members of the bar, especially those whose practices include
representation of persons with mental disabilities.
This list is in no way comprehensive. I offer it here as a modest
starting point. If we begin to think critically about these issues, it is far
more likely that we will begin to take seriously the core questions about
sexuality and autonomy that I pose in this Article.
CONCLUSION
I chose Bob Dylan’s “Desolation Row” to use in the title of this
Article because of its depiction of a “cultural jumble” built on “general
deviance.”143 The sanism that is shown towards patients in forensic
facilities and towards patients in Asia, as well as the pretextuality that
defines the judicial process as it relates to these issues, similarly
“jumble” mental disability law, confounding and conflating different
types of social deviance. This creates another desolation row. In one of
the starkest images in the song, Dylan sings:
And the only sound that’s left
After the ambulances go
Is Cinderella sweeping up
On Desolation Row[.]144
In the past four decades, a sexual revolution changed the way we
think about gender, sex roles, personal relationships, and sexual
expression. The last thirty years have seen a legal civil-rights revolution

141. On how lawyers are sanist, see Michael L. Perlin, “Baby, Look Inside Your Mirror”: The
Legal Profession's Willful and Sanist Blindness to Lawyers with Mental Disabilities, 69 U. PITT. L.
REV. 589, 604–05 (2008). See also Aaron Dhir, Relationships of Force: Reflections on Law,
Psychiatry, and Human Rights, 25 WINDSOR REV. LEGAL & SOC. ISSUES 103, 108 (2008) (“[T]he
primary responsibility for the lack of rights realization lies not with judges, not with legislators and
not with clinicians. Rather, it lies with us - the lawyers who represent, and will go on to represent,
persons with psychiatric disabilities.”).
142. See Perlin, supra note 141, at 590 (“Just as lawyers are sanist towards clients with mental
disabilities, they are sanist towards their peers with mental disabilities.”); Perlin, Lepers, supra note
1, at 700 (“Even a cursory examination of the ethical issues permeating the representation of
persons with mental disabilities readily evidences the omnipresence of sanism.”).
143. Kermode & Spender, supra note 21, at 158–59.
144. BobDylan.com, supra note 17.
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affect the way that we think about persons with mental disabilities, both
in institutional and community settings.145 The last twenty years have
seen a revolution in the joining together of the international humanrights movement and the mental disability law movement.146 Perhaps we
can now turn our attention to the relationship between these two
revolutions. If we can do so, then there will be more to this area of the
law than, simply, another “desolation row.”

145. Perlin, supra note 9, at 547.
146. See, e.g., PERLIN, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 37; Perlin & Szeli, supra note 82.
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